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Abstract 
The informal credit market remains an important source of finance for the poor in 
Vietnam. Yet, little if anything is known about the ultimate impact of informal loans 
on poverty and inequality. If informal credit is an important means to decrease 
poverty, the government may want to reconsider its policy focus. Although it is 
possible to stimulate the availability of informal credit, the Vietnamese government 
has no policies to do so and focuses solely on direct provision of microfinance. In this 
paper we therefore estimate the average effect of informal credit on expenditures of 
borrowing households, and subsequently assess its impact on poverty and inequality. 
By using fixed-effect regressions with instrumental variables, we intend to eliminate 
the potential bias caused by differences between participants and non-participants in 
credit markets. We find that the poor borrowed proportionally more from informal 
sources than the non-poor and that informal credit was quite effective in decreasing 
poverty: it reduced the poverty incidence of borrowers by 8 percentage points and the 
overall poverty incidence of population by 1.4 percentage points in 2006. Similarly, 
informal credit significantly decreased the poverty gap index and the poverty-severity 
index. The effects on expenditure inequality were small.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Credit is seen as an important tool for households to promote production and business, 
increase income and reduce consumption fluctuations. Micro-credit and other 
financial services would enable the poor to build assets, increase incomes, and reduce 
their vulnerability to economic stress. Credit is severely rationed for poor households. 
Commercial banks are not interested in poor clients because of information problems 
and lack of collateral (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Nagarajan, et al, 1995; Kochar, 1997; 
Bell et al, 1997; Bose, 1998; Boucher et al, 2008). Governments and NGOs have 
stepped into the gap and have provided credit to the poor, often at highly subsidized 
interest rates. However, while micro-credit programs do not require collateral, they do 
screen borrowers by other eligibility criteria such as poverty status or repayment 
capacity, often indirectly through peer groups. Moreover, repayment requirements are 
usually inflexible. As a result, not all poor households may be able or willing to obtain 
micro-credit, and some may resort to informal credit.  
The informal credit market remains an important source of finance for the poor 
(Nagarajan et al, 1995; Kochar, 1997; Bell et al, 1997; Agénor and Montiel, 1999; 
Conning and Udry, 2005; Guirkinger, 1998). Despite the popular view of 
moneylenders as usurers, informal loans may help to increase capital and mitigate 
consumption fluctuations and thus enable the poor to grow out of poverty. While the 
existing lending capacity of the informal sector is supposedly limited, carefully 
designed government policies could help expanding available resources and thus 
indirectly increase the volume of informal loans. Moneylenders could be linked to 
banks to enable the use of formal sector money for loans to the poor (Fuentes, 1996, 
Varghese, 2005). On the other hand, financial policies can limit the terms and 
availability of informal loans: Subsidized programs may attract the best borrowers and 
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leave the riskier clients with higher enforcement costs to non-subsidized lenders 
(Morduch, 1999; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Bose, 1998; Jain, 1999). When designing 
policies to increase credit access for the poor, it is therefore important to consider not 
only microfinance programs and other formal sources of credit, but also the informal 
credit market. Yet few countries have explicit policies aiming to strengthen the 
informal financial sector, possibly because of limited knowledge of the role of 
informal credit in increasing household welfare and reducing poverty and inequality. 
It is our understanding that there are no studies on the quantitative impacts of informal 
credit on household welfare, while there are a large number of studies on empirical 
impacts of micro-credit (see Morduch and Haley, 2002, for review),  
This paper contributes to the credit literature by presenting an empirical analysis 
of the impact of informal credit on poverty and inequality in Vietnam between 2004 
and 2006. Vietnam is often mentioned as an example of a country successful in 
poverty reduction. Over the past decade, Vietnam has witnessed remarkable reduction 
in poverty. According to the Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys, the 
poverty incidence decreased from 58 percent in 1993 to 29 percent in 2002, and 
continued to decrease to 16 percent in 2006. Informal credit is an important source of 
capital flows for people in Vietnam. In the early 1990s, informal credit accounted for 
more than 70 percent of total credit in the rural areas (McCarty, 2001; Pham and 
Lensink, 2007). The proportion of informal loans decreased over time because of the 
growing role of formal credit. Using a data sample of four provinces in Vietnam, 
Barslund and Tarp (2008) found that the informal loans still accounted for 36 percent 
of all loans in rural areas in 2003.  
Yet, it seems that informal credit has mostly been ignored in both research and 
policy in Vietnam, while the substantial size of the informal sector and its generally 
low entrance barriers suggest that it is important for the poor. If indeed it is, the 
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government may shift their focus at least partly away from direct provision of credit 
to stimulating the linkages between the formal and the informal credit market, 
especially given the mixed results of existing impact studies for (mostly) formal 
credit. Using the Vietnam Living Standard Surveys (VLSS) for 1993 and 1998, Quach 
and Mullineux (2007) found that total credit helped increase household expenditure. 
Similarly, Nguyen (2008) found that micro-credit from Vietnam Bank for Social 
Policies had positive effects on income, consumption and poverty reduction of the 
borrowers in the rural areas using the Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys 
(VHLSS) for 2002 and 2004. Using the two most recent VHLSSs - 2004 and 2006 - 
Pham and Lensink (2008) came to a different conclusion. They conclude that micro-
credit did not affect household self-employment profits, while credit from commercial 
banks seemed to help households increase their self-employment profits. These 
studies indicate not only that the effect of credit may have changed over time, but also 
that impact differs depending of the source of credit.  
Separating out the causal role of credit is extremely difficult, and there is no 
study yet that has achieved wide consensus as to its reliability (Armendáriz de Aghion 
and Morduch, 2005). The borrowing process depends on the characteristics of both 
borrowers and lenders. Borrowers are therefore different from non-borrowers. 
Unfortunately, not all of these differences are easily measured. Borrowers may, for 
example, have a more entrepreneurial spirit and better business connections than non-
borrowers. These unobserved differences, and not getting access to credit, may 
explain income and investment differences between borrowers and seemingly similar 
non-borrowers. Failing to account for this attribution problem will lead to biased 
estimates of program impact, and the bias can be large. We apply fixed-effect 
regression with instrumental variables regression to prevent such biases. Based on the 
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regressions, we compute the average effects of informal credit on household 
expenditures and compute their on poverty and inequality. 
 The remainder of the paper is structured into 5 sections. The second section 
describes data set used in this study. The third section presents background 
information on poverty and informal credit. The fourth section presents the estimation 
method. Next, the empirical findings on impact measurement are presented in the fifth 
section. Finally, the sixth section concludes.    
 
2. Data Sources 
 
The study relies on data from the two most recent Vietnam Household Living 
Standard Surveys (VHLSS), which were conducted by the General Statistical Office 
of Vietnam (GSO) with technical support from the World Bank (WB) in the years 
2004 and 2006. The 2004 and 2006 VHLSSs cover 9188 and 9189 households, 
respectively. The samples are representative for the national, rural and urban, and 
regional levels. The 2004 and 2006 VHLSSs result in a panel of 4216 households, for 
which data is available for both years. The number of urban and rural households is 
1012 and 3204, respectively. 
The sample selection of VHLSSs 2004 and 2006 follows a method of stratified 
random cluster sampling. GSO selected households in all rural and urban provinces of 
Vietnam, i.e. rural and urban areas of all provinces are strata. Among each stratum, 
communes were selected randomly as a primary sampling unit. The number of 
communes per stratum is proportionate to the population. The number of selected 
communes in each VHLSS is 3063. In each commune, about 3 households were 
selected randomly.  
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The surveys collected information through household and community level 
questionnaires. Information on households includes basic demography, employment 
and labour force participation, education, health, income, expenditure, housing, fixed 
assets and durable goods, participation of households in poverty alleviation programs, 
and especially information on loans that households had obtained or still owed during 
the 12 months before the interview. 
Data on expenditures were collected using very detailed questionnaires. 
Information on small and detailed expenditure categories was collected and then 
aggregated into expenditure per capita. Food expenditure includes purchased food and 
foodstuff and self-produced products of households. Non-food expenditure comprises 
expenditures on education, healthcare, housing, consumer durables, power, water 
supply and garbage collection.  
Information was also collected on commune characteristics, but only for rural 
areas. In our analysis, we use two commune level variables, namely distance to the 
nearest market and a dummy variable indicating whether the village has a road. Since 
our sample includes the entire country, we had to come up with estimates for the 
urban areas. We assumed that for urban areas, the variables “distance to market” and 
“have a road” are equal to 0 and 1, respectively.  This is a reasonable assumption 
given the fact that in all cities there is a market and at least one road.  
 
3. Poverty and Informal Credit in Vietnam 
 
In this paper, a household is classified as poor if their per capita expenditure is below 
the poverty line set up by WB and GSO. The poverty line is equivalent to the 
expenditure level that allows for nutritional needs with food consumption securing 
2100 calories per day per person and some essential non-food consumption such as 
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clothing and housing. The poverty lines for the years 2004 and 2006 are 2077 and 
2560 thousands VND, respectively.3  
The poverty rate declined continuously over the period 1993-2006. The 
proportion of poor dropped dramatically from 58 percent in 1993 to 37 percent in 
1998, and continued to decrease to 20 and 16 percent in 2004 and 2006, respectively. 
In rural areas, however, poverty was more prevalent than the country-average, with a 
poverty rate of 20 percent in 2006. The reduction of poverty was associated with a 
moderate increase in inequality. The Gini index based on expenditure per capita 
increased from 0.33 in 1993 to 0.36 in 2006. 
To examine how informal credit reached poor households, we calculate the 
percentage of households having informal credit using the data from VHLSS 2004 
and 2006.  There is a tendency of contraction of informal credit. The percentage of 
households borrowing from informal credit was reduced from 38 percent in 1993 
(according to the 1993 Vietnam Living Standard Survey) to 20 and 16 in 2004 and 
2006, respectively (Table 1). The poor are more likely to have informal loans than the 
non-poor. In 2006, informal credit covered 21 percent of poor households and 15 
percent of non-poor households. However, the non-poor had much higher average 
loan sizes than the poor. In 2006, loan size per borrowing household was VND 3,977 
and 6,372 thousand for the poor and non-poor respectively. The fraction of informal 
credit to total household expenditures was equal to around 38 and 54 percent for poor 
and non-poor households, respectively. Since the number of the non-poor was much 
larger than the number of the poor, the non-poor also accounted for most informal 
borrowers: In 2006, non-poor households accounted for 83 percent of all borrowing 
households and obtained 95 percent of total informal credit.  
                                                     
3
 1 USD is approximately equivalent to 15,777 and 16,054 VND in January 2004 and January 2006, 
respectively. 
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[Table 1 about here] 
 
It should be noted that the average interest rate of informal credit was higher 
than that of micro-credit provided by Vietnam Bank for Social Policies, but still lower 
than the average interest rate of formal credit. In 2006, the average monthly interest 
rate of formal credit, micro-credit and formal credit is 0.53 percent, 0.36 percent and 
0.93 percent, respectively. A possible reason why the informal credit interest rate is 
lower than the formal credit interest rate is that informal loans from friends and 
relatives accounted for 76 percent of the total informal loans. People tend to charge 
low or zero interest rates for their friends and relatives.    
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 One important issue in examining the effectiveness of the credit is the use of 
credit. Table 2 tabulates the informal loan size by the use purposes reported by 
households. Although credit is fungible, this table might give some insight how the 
credit are used. It shows that nearly one-third of informal credit is supposedly used for 
investment and production capital. In 2006, the poor and non-poor households 
claimed to use 22 and 10 percent of informal loans for agricultural production and 
investment. However, the non-poor reported higher spending of more credit on non-
farm activities. In 2006, the poor and non-poor claimed to use around 2 and 16 
percent of the VBSP credit for service and business activities, respectively. Credit was 
also used for debt repayment and important needs such as house construction, 
healthcare and education. More specifically, more than one-third of informal credit 
was said to be used for house construction and purchase, and the remaining amount of 
informal credit was spent in debt repayment and other consumptions.  
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4. Impact evaluation methodology 
 
Impact of credit on expenditures 
 
To assess the impact of informal credit, we assume welfare can be specified as 
follows: 
( ) ijtjtijtijttijt CDXGY ηβββββ +++++= 43210ln ,       (1)  
where ( )ijtYln  is logarithm of expenditures per capita.  The subscripts i, j and t refer to 
household i in commune j at time t, respectively. Note that “per capita” refers to the 
average per household member at period t. Per capita expenditure is thus calculated as 
total household expenditures at period t divided by the number of household members 
at period t. Gt is a year dummy, with a one for 2006; This dummy enables to control 
for common macroeconomic changes between the two years. X and C are vectors of 
household and community level control variables. D is a dummy variable indicating 
whether a household obtained informal credit.4  
The main problem in estimating the equation is the endogeneity of informal 
credit market participation. Borrowing can be correlated with unobserved 
characteristics of households such as abilities and skills in production and business. 
Failure to control for such factors leads to biased estimates of program impact. In this 
study, we use the panel nature of the data and instrumental variables regression to 
avoid endogeneity bias. Firstly, to show how the panel nature of the data helps 
reducing the endogeneity problem, suppose the error term can be split into two 
                                                     
4
 We do not use the loan size as the credit variable, since the loan size is continuous variable, and the 
semi-log function of consumption will impose an unrealistic assumption on the increasing marginal 
impact of credit on consumption. We do not use the logarithm of credit in the right-hand side, since 
there are many households without credit, and taking logarithm of zero returns missing values. In 
addition, using the dummy variable of credit recipient can reduce measurement error of credit data. 
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components: a combined household and commune specific error, uij + vj, which is 
correlated with D but stable over time, and εijt, which is allowed to change over time. 
Equation (1) then becomes 
( ) ijtjijjtijtijttijt uCDXGY ενβββββ +++++++= 43210ln ,      (2)  
or alternatively 
( ) ijtjtijtijttijijt CDXGY εβββββ +++++= 43210ln .       (3)  
If εijt is uncorrelated with D, equation (3) can be estimated without bias using fixed-
effects techniques. However, it is possible that there is a correlation between εijt and 
D. For example, households who experience an income reduction due to negative 
shocks such as labor and crop losses need to resort to informal credit. In other words, 
the remaining endogeneity can rise because of individual time-invariant unobserved 
variables, such as income shocks, which affect both household expenditures and the 
probability of borrowing from informal sources. To deal with this endogeneity, we 
use instrumental-variables regression.  
 It should be noted that we apply instrumental-variables regression to equation 
(3) instead of equation (1), i.e. we use fixed-effects with instrumental-variables 
regression. Equation (3) contains only one error term εijt (the error terms, uij and vj, are 
removed using fixed-effect transformation), and as a result the condition on the 
absence of correlation between error term and the D variable is more like to be 
achieved.  
We will measure the impact of informal credit by calculating the Average 
Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) (Heckman et al., 1999). ATT is the expected 
impact of credit receipt on borrowers (with D = 1):  
( )( ) ( )( )11 01 =−== == ijtDijtijtDijtt DYEDYEATT ,       (4) 
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Where )1( )0( == ijtDijt DYE  is the expected value of the outcome variable of the 
borrowers, i.e. expenditure per capita had they not received credit. This is not 
observed and has to be estimated.  
Using equation (1), we get 
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The ATT at time t is thus estimated by: 
( )∑
=
−
−=
tn
i
ijt
t
t Ye
n
TTA
1
ˆ
311ˆ β ,          (6) 
where nt is the number of the borrowers at the time t.  
We estimate the standard error of the ATT estimates by using a non-
parametric bootstrap technique. This bootstrap is implemented by repeatedly drawing 
samples from the original sample of the VHLSS panel data. Since the VHLSSs 
sample selection follows stratified random cluster sampling, communes instead of 
households are bootstrapped in each stratum (Deaton, 1997). In other words, the 
bootstrap is made of communes (i.e., clusters) within strata. The number of 
replications is 500.5    
 
                                                     
5
 In order to examine the robustness of our bootstrap technique, we also tried to bootstrap households. 
The results were similar. 
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The impact of credit on poverty and inequality 
 
We calculate poverty by three Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty indexes, which can all 
be calculated using the following formula (Foster, Greer and Thorbecke, 1984): 
∑
=





 −
=
q
i
i
z
Yz
n
P
1
1 α
α ,                                                                                            (7) 
where Yi is a welfare indicator for person i. We use consumption expenditure per 
capita as the welfare indicator, since, as is well known, consumption is a better proxy 
for well-being than income. z is the expenditure poverty line, n is the number of 
people in the sample population, q is the number of poor people, and α can be 
interpreted as a measure of inequality aversion.  
When α = 0, we have the headcount index H, which measures the proportion of 
people below the poverty line. When α = 1 and α = 2, we obtain the poverty gap PG, 
which measures the depth of poverty, and the squared poverty gap P2 which measures 
the severity of poverty, respectively. 
To measure inequality, we use three common measures of inequality: the Gini 
coefficient, Theil’s L index of inequality, and Theil’s T index of inequality. The Gini 
index can be calculated from the individual expenditure in the population:  
∑
=
−
−
−
+
=
n
i
iiYYnnn
nG
1)1(
2
1
1 ρ                                  (8)                                              
where Y  is the average per capita expenditure; iρ  is the rank of person i in the Y-
distribution, counting from the richest so that the richest has the rank of 1. The value 
of the Gini coefficient varies from 0 when everyone has the same income to 1 when 
one person has everything. The closer a Gini coefficient is to one, the more unequal is 
the income distribution.  
The Theil L index of inequality is calculated as follows: 
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∑
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The Theil L index ranges from 0 to infinity. A higher value of Theil L indicates more 
inequality. 
The Theil T index of inequality is calculated as: 
 ∑
=






=
n
i
ii
Y
Y
Y
Y
n
TTheil
1
ln1_               (10) 
The Theil T index ranges from 0 (lowest inequality) to ln(N) (highest inequality).  
The impact of credit on the poverty indices of borrowers in period t is calculated 
as follows: 
),1(),1( )0( ==−==∆ Dtttt YDPYDPP ,                  (11) 
where the first term on the right-hand side of (11) is the poverty measure of the credit 
receiving households given their credit. This term is observed and can be computed 
directly from the sample data. However, the second term on the right-hand side of 
(11) is the counterfactual measure of poverty, i.e., poverty indexes of the borrower 
had they not borrowed. This term is not observed directly, and is estimated by using 
equation (1), and substituting these estimates of expenditure into equation (7).   
 We also measure the impact of credit on total poverty: 
)()( )0( =−=∆ Dtt YPYPP ,          (12) 
where P(Yt) is the observed poverty index of the entire population  and  )( )0( =DtYP  is 
the poverty index of the entire population if the borrower had not received the credit. 
The difference between equations (12) and (11) is that the latter only looks at the 
effect on borrowers, while the former considers the effect on the entire population. 
Regarding inequality, we only measure the impact of credit on inequality of the entire 
population. The impact on the inequality index is given by: 
)()( )0( =−=∆ Dtt YIYII ,                           (13) 
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where )( tYI is observed inequality, which is calculated using the observed expenditure 
data. )( )0( =DtYI  is an inequality index in the absence of the credit, which is estimated 
using the predicted counterfactual expenditure without the credit, using equation (1). 
The standard errors of the estimates of impacts on poverty and inequality are 
estimated using the same bootstrap technique as for ATT.  
 
5. Impact Estimation Results 
 
The Impact of Informal Credit on Per Capita Expenditure  
 
To estimate the effects of informal credit on per capita expenditure, we regress per 
capita expenditure on the informal credit dummy and a set of control variables. 
Control variables include household composition, education of household members, 
land and housing, villages, urbanity, credit from other sources and regional variables. 
It should be noted that control variables should be exogenous to credit (Heckman et 
al., 1999; Ravallion, 2001). Thus, several asset variables such as living areas and 
housing types are not included as control variables since these variables can be 
affected by credit (Table 2 shows that some households reported the use of credit for 
housing construction and purchase). We tested whether informal credit had a different 
impact in rural and urban areas by including interaction terms for credit and a dummy 
for living in an urban area. These estimates indicate that the effects of credit do not 
differ between urban and rural areas. We, therefore, only present the estimates for the 
entire sample.  
The list of the variables and summary statistics for borrowing and non-
borrowing households are presented in Table A.1 in the Appendix. In order to control 
for inflation, we have deflated all variables in terms of 2004 prices. Table 3 
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summarizes the regressions without instrumentation (See Table A.2 in the Appendix 
for full regression results). We present both random effects and fixed effects 
estimates, without and with sampling weight and cluster correlation. It shows that 
OLS pooled sample and random-effects regressions without control variables give 
negative signs for informal credit. This is consistent with the description in Table 1 
that poor households are more likely to borrow from informal sources than non-poor 
households. Adding control variables to OLS and random-effect regressions decreases 
the size of the informal credit effect, but the estimates remain negative. Instead, the 
fixed-effects regression with control variables, which the Hausman test strongly 
favors over the random effects regressions, produces a significantly positive effect. 
This finding implies that credit is correlated with unobserved household 
characteristics, and that without correcting for this we underestimate the positive 
impact of borrowing and even find negative effects.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Although fixed-effects regressions corrects for time-invariant unobserved 
variables, they fail to deal with time-variant unobserved variables as explained above. 
Thus, we also use instrumental-variables regression. In this study, we use the 
proportion of informal borrowers within a district as an instrument for the informal 
credit borrowing of households in that district. For each household, we calculate the 
proportion of informal borrowers within the district of residence, excluding the 
household itself. The average number of sampled households per district in the 
VHLSSs is 15. We do not estimate the fraction of informal borrowing households per 
commune, since there are only 3 sampled households in each commune.  
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The key identification assumptions of instrumental variables regression are that 
the instruments are correlated with borrowing from informal sources and excluded 
from the expenditure equation. The fraction of informal borrowers in a district reflects 
the availability of informal credit networks in the district. We expect that these 
networks affect the probability of obtaining informal credit but not household welfare 
directly. The condition of correlation between the instrumental variable and 
borrowing can be tested by running a regression of informal credit borrowing on the 
instrumental variable and other control variables. Table A.4 in Appendix report the 
first-stage regressions which show that “fraction of informal credit borrowers” is 
strongly correlated with the borrowing from informal sources. The tests for weak 
instruments also strongly reject the null hypothesis that instruments are weak (as a 
rule of thumb, when a test value is over 10, the instruments is not weak, see Staige 
and Stock, 1997).  
When using the two instruments, we can perform overidentification tests. To 
find the second instrument, we interacted the first instrument “the district fraction of 
informal credit borrowers” with other exogenous household variables including 
household composition variables, and tested whether these interactions are significant 
in the first-stage regressions.6 We selected the household composition variables for 
interaction, since household composition can be correlated with local networks. For 
instance, households with more elderly may have more relations with other local 
households. Among the interaction terms, only the interaction between the district 
fraction of informal credit borrowers and the proportion of elderly was statistically 
significant in the first stage-regressions. Therefore this term is used as the second 
instrument. Table A.5 reports overidentification tests of instrumental variables. It 
                                                     
6
 Suppose that Z is an instrument for D in equation (3). then one can use ZX is instrument for DX, 
where X is an exogenous control variable (see Wooldridge, 2001). It means that we can use both Z and 
ZX as instruments for D. 
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shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis on overidentification, which indicates that 
the instruments are valid.  
In addition, the endogeneity of informal borrowing can be tested using the 
instruments. Results from Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests shows that the hypothesis on the 
exogeneity is strongly rejected.   
Table 4 summarizes the results from the instrumental variables regressions: 
Random-effects and fixed-effect regressions with instrumental variables. (The full 
regression results are presented in Table A3 in the appendix.) The regressions suggest 
that borrowing from informal sources significantly increases per capita expenditure. 
Instrumental variables regressions produces higher point estimates of the informal 
borrowing than regressions without instrumental variables. Interestingly, all IV 
regressions yield very similar estimates of the impact of informal credit, indicating the 
robustness of the estimates.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
We use results from the fixed-effect model with two instruments to estimate 
ATT of informal credit (Table 5). It shows that the borrowing from informal sources 
helped households increase their per capita expenditure by around 442 and 512 
thousand VND in 2004 and 2006, respectively (approximately an increase of 14 
percent for each year). At an average household size of five, this amounts to 2210 and 
2560 thousand VND, respectively. It should be noted that the average loan size was 
9396 in 2004 and 9676 in 2006. This implies that an increase of the loan by 1 VND 
would have resulted in an increase in household expenditure of 0.23 and 0.21 VND in 
2004 and 2006, respectively. 
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[Table 5 about here] 
 
The Impact of Informal Credit on Poverty and Inequality  
 
Using results from the fixed-effect model with two instruments, we estimate the 
impact of informal credit on poverty and inequality. Table 6 shows that informal 
credit significantly decreased poverty. The observed headcount of poverty for 
informal borrowers was 39 percent in 2006. Without informal credit, this would have 
been 8 percentage points higher. Hence, the headcount was reduced by 28 percent in 
2006. Similarly, borrowing from informal sources decreased the poverty-gap index by 
0.02, which is a reduction of almost 35 percent. The percentage-reduction in the 
poverty-severity index was about the same. As 21 percent of poor households 
obtained informal credit, this translated in a decrease in the overall head count index 
of poverty by around 1.4 percentage points in 2006. The effects on the other poverty 
indicators are also negative and statistically significant. The effect estimates in 2004 
and 2006 are quite similar.   
Interestingly, informal credit helped decrease total expenditure inequality. With 
informal credit, Gini, Theil T and Theil L are all significantly lower than without 
informal credit, but the decrease is less than one percent of the without informal credit 
value. It is not surprising that these numbers are low, as they refer to the entire 
population, and informal credit covered only 21 percent of households. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
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6. Conclusions 
 
When some people, especially the poor, do not have access to formal credit or micro-
credit programs, they have to resort to informal credit. While more expensive, these 
loans may be more easily accessible for the poor than subsidized loans, which could 
be siphoned off by wealthier households. Informal credit remains popular in Vietnam 
as well as other developing countries, and it can help households not only increase 
capital for production but also smooth consumption fluctuations. Although it is 
possible to stimulate the availability of informal credit, the Vietnamese government 
has no policies to do so and its current subsidized credit policy may even inhibit the 
functioning of the informal credit markets by taking its best clients. If indeed informal 
credit is an important means to increase expenditures for the poor, the government 
may want to reconsider its policy focus.  
Yet, little is known about the ultimate impact of informal loans on poverty and 
inequality. Most empirical studies focus on the impact of micro-credit. In Vietnam, 
there are no studies which measure the impact of informal credit. Thus, in this paper, 
we estimate the average effect of informal credit on expenditures of borrowing 
households, and subsequently assess its impact on poverty and inequality. By using 
fixed-effect regressions with instrumental variables, we intend to eliminate the 
potential bias caused by differences between participants and non-participants in 
credit markets. Data used in this paper are from two recent household surveys, the 
Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys in 2004 and 2006.  
We find that the poor borrowed proportionally more from informal sources than 
the non-poor. In 2006, 21 percent of poor households and 15 percent of non-poor 
households borrowed from informal sources. The impact of informal credit on 
household welfare was quite encouraging. Borrowing from informal sources seemed 
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to have increased per capita expenditures by about 14 percent. Not surprisingly, we 
therefore find that informal credit was quite effective in decreasing poverty: it reduced 
the poverty incidence of borrowers by 8 percentage points and the overall poverty 
incidence of population by 1.4 percentage points in 2006. Similarly, the program 
significantly decreased the poverty gap index and the poverty-severity index. Informal 
credit decreased expenditure inequality of the population, but the decrease is less than 
one percent of the without credit value. 
Summarizing, we found empirical evidence that informal credit can be an 
effectively tool to increase household welfare, reduce poverty and inequality. Clearly, 
informal credit can help achieve the government objectives of decreasing poverty and 
inequality without subsidized funds from the government. While not directly under 
public control, financial intermediation through informal lenders is not immune to 
public policies. Governments can facilitate intermediation through the provision of 
important basic infrastructure, such as a systems of laws and courts to support the 
creation and enforcement of property rights and contracts, credit bureaus to publicize 
information, and prudential regulation of financial institutions (Conning and Udry, 
2005).  
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List of Tables 
Table 1: The borrowing from informal credit sources 
 
 
2004   2006 
 
Poor Non-Poor Total Poor Non-Poor Total 
% houses borrowing from informal 
sources 
26.3 18.5 19.8 20.5 15.4 16.1 
[1.2] [0.5] [0.5] [1.3] [0.5] [0.4] 
Loan size per borrowing household 
(thousand VND) 
3540.5 11111.7 9396.3 2968.9 11078.6 9676.9 
[378.3] [1151.8] [899.5] [247.9] [748.7] [629.2] 
Distribution of the borrowing 
households 
22.7 77.3 100 17.3 82.7 100 
[1.1] [1.1]         [1.1] [1.1]         
Distribution of loan across borrowing 
households 
8.5 91.5 100 5.3 94.7 100 
[1.3] [1.3]         [0.7] [0.7]         
Ratio of loan to expenditure 
45.9 63.1 61.5 38.0 53.8 52.8 
[4.9] [9.5] [8.6] [3.3] [3.5] [3.2] 
Monthly interest (%) 0.60 0.62 0.61 0.85 0.51 0.53 [0.11] [0.09] [0.08] [0.19] [0.05] [0.05] 
Number of observations 1769 7419 9188 1427 7762 9189  
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and cluster correlation. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSSs 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
Table 2: The use of informal credit 
Activities 
 2004   2006  
Poor Non-Poor Total Poor Non-Poor Total 
Investment and production       
Agriculture/Fishery/Aquaculture 24.1 11.5 12.5 21.5 10.0 10.6 
 [3.8] [2.0] [1.9] [3.9] [1.5] [1.4] 
Services and business 3.6 24.2 22.4 1.6 15.9 15.1 
 [1.4] [6.6] [6.2] [1.0] [3.4] [3.3] 
Other non-farm activities 0.7 11.0 10.1 1.7 2.4 2.4 
 [0.4] [4.4] [4.1] [0.9] [0.7] [0.7] 
Consumption       
Debt repayment 5.3 4.1 4.2 10.3 6.0 6.2 
 [1.3] [1.1] [1.0] [2.7] [1.2] [1.2] 
House construction/purchase 29.4 21.7 22.4 36.4 31.7 32.0 
 [5.7] [3.3] [3.1] [5.5] [3.1] [3.0] 
Education 0.6 1.7 1.6 2.7 3.0 2.9 
 [0.3] [0.3] [0.3] [1.1] [0.5] [0.5] 
Healthcare 7.5 8.0 7.9 5.4 7.8 7.6 
 [1.7] [1.1] [1.0] [1.6] [1.2] [1.1] 
Durable appliances  5.7 2.7 3.0 1.5 3.5 3.4 
 [1.7] [0.5] [0.5] [0.8] [0.6] [0.6] 
Other consumption 23.1 15.3 15.9 19.0 19.7 19.7 
 [6.6] [2.5] [2.4] [2.8] [2.7] [2.6] 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Number of observations 498 1572 2070 305 1363 1668 
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and cluster correlation. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSSs 2004 and 2006. 
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Table 3: The effect of informal loans on per capita expenditures 
Explanatory variables OLS - 
pooled 
sample 
(with 
sampling 
weights) 
Random 
effects panel 
data        (no 
sampling 
weights) 
Fixed 
effects 
panel data 
(with 
sampling 
weights) 
OLS - 
pooled 
sample 
(with 
sampling 
weights) 
Random 
effects 
panel data        
(no 
sampling 
weights) 
Fixed 
effects 
panel data 
(with 
sampling 
weights) 
Informal loans ( × 1000 VND) -0.2053*** -0.0535*** -0.0087 -0.0887*** -0.0187* 0.0297** 
  [0.0180] [0.0126] [0.0143]  [0.0135] [0.0112]  [0.0129] 
Notes : The regressions include household and regional control variables 
Robust standard errors in brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
Table 4: The effect of informal loans on per capita expenditures: Instrumental 
variables regressions 
Explanatory variables Pooled 
sample: IV 
regression 
with one 
instrument 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
Pooled 
sample: IV 
regression 
with two 
instruments 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
Random 
effects 
panel data:   
IV 
regression 
with one 
instrument 
(no 
sampling 
weight) 
Random 
effects 
panel data:   
IV 
regression 
with two 
instruments 
(no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects 
panel data:   
IV 
regression 
with one 
instrument 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects 
panel data:   
IV 
regression 
with two 
instruments 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
Informal loans ( × 1000 VND) 0.0983** 0.1034** 0.1002*** 0.1042*** 0.1271*** 0.1274*** 
 [0.0415] [0.0413] [0.0371] [0.0369] [0.0457] [0.0445] 
Notes : The regressions include household and regional control variables 
Robust standard errors in brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 5: Impact of informal credit on expenditures per capita measured by ATT 
Year Y1 Y0 ATT 
(Y1 – Y0) 
2004 3701.1*** 3258.3*** 442.8*** 
 [78.8] [166.8] [154.7] 
2006 4279.8*** 3767.8*** 512.1*** 
 [107.9] [204.2] [180.8] 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using 
bootstrap (non-parametric) with 500 replications. 
Source: Estimation from VHLSSs 2004 and 2006 
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Table 6: Impact of informal credit on poverty and inequality 
 
 2004   2006  
With credit Without credit Impact With credit Without credit Impact 
Poverty of borrowers 
     
P0 0.2532*** 0.3282*** -0.0750** 0.1972*** 0.2805*** -0.0833** 
 [0.0123] [0.0326] [0.0307] [0.0135] [0.0348] [0.0327] 
P1 0.0574*** 0.0855*** -0.0281** 0.0468*** 0.0694*** -0.0226** 
 [0.0039] [0.0127] [0.0117] [0.0045] [0.0110] [0.0098] 
P2 0.0204*** 0.0319*** -0.0115** 0.0170*** 0.0262*** -0.0092** 
 [0.0020] [0.0058] [0.0052] [0.0021] [0.0048] [0.0041] 
All poverty 
      
P0 0.1949*** 0.2102*** -0.0153** 0.1597*** 0.1736*** -0.0138** 
 [0.0058] [0.0084] [0.0063] [0.0059] [0.0080] [0.0055] 
P1 0.0472*** 0.0529*** -0.0057** 0.0383*** 0.0421*** -0.0037** 
 [0.0019] [0.0031] [0.0024] [0.0019] [0.0026] [0.0016] 
P2 0.0170*** 0.0193*** -0.0023** 0.0137*** 0.0152*** -0.0015** 
 [0.0009] [0.0015] [0.0011] [0.0009] [0.0012] [0.0007] 
All inequality 
      
Gini 0.3698*** 0.3742*** -0.0043** 0.3580*** 0.3613*** -0.0034** 
 [0.0050] [0.0054] [0.0019] [0.0046] [0.0047] [0.0015] 
Theil L 0.2235*** 0.2291*** -0.0055** 0.2117*** 0.2159*** -0.0041** 
 [0.0062] [0.0068] [0.0025] [0.0056] [0.0059] [0.0019] 
Theil T 0.2407*** 0.2466*** -0.0059** 0.2268*** 0.2310*** -0.0043** 
 [0.0077] [0.0083] [0.0026] [0.0074] [0.0076] [0.0019] 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-parametric) with 500 replications. 
Source: Estimation from VHLSSs 2004 and 2006. 
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Appendix  
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics of households with and without informal credit 
Variables Type 2004 2006 
Household 
with 
informal 
credit 
Household 
without 
informal 
credit 
Household 
with 
informal 
credit 
Household 
without 
informal 
credit 
Household variables      
Ratio of members younger than 16 to total 
household members 
Continuous 0.2970 0.2579 0.2735 0.2347 
 [0.0058] [0.0028] [0.0062] [0.0027] 
Ratio of members older than 60 to total 
household members 
Continuous 0.0748 0.0983 0.0670 0.1027 
 [0.0035] [0.0021] [0.0037] [0.0021] 
Ratio of female members to total household 
members 
Continuous 0.5050 0.5054 0.5097 0.5099 
 [0.0044] [0.0022] [0.0047] [0.0022] 
Household size Discrete 5.0194 5.0105 4.8786 4.8650 
  [0.0593] [0.0294] [0.0551] [0.0321] 
Ratio of members with technical degree to 
total household members 
Continuous 0.0568 0.0581 0.0636 0.0677 
 [0.0037] [0.0020] [0.0048] [0.0021] 
Ratio of members with post secondary to 
total household members 
Continuous 0.0150 0.0368 0.0183 0.0374 
 [0.0020] [0.0019] [0.0024] [0.0018] 
Area of annual crop land per capita (m2) Continuous 573.9 692.9 627.6 708.9 
  [31.0] [20.7] [35.6] [21.8] 
Area of perennial crop land per capita (m2) Continuous 183.2 206.7 221.7 241.5 
  [27.8] [15.6] [24.2] [15.4] 
Forestry land per capita (m2) Continuous 170.4 200.6 175.9 221.8 
  [36.3] [25.6] [32.4] [30.5] 
Aquaculture water surface per capita (m2) Continuous 27.6 67.6 43.0 65.4 
  [5.2] [8.7] [13.9] [9.0] 
Commune variables      
Road to village (yes = 1) Binary 0.6735 0.5846 0.7090 0.6208 
  [0.0151] [0.0103] [0.0157] [0.0101] 
Distance to nearest daily market (km) Continuous 2.3459 2.1588 2.7613 2.2634 
  [0.1534] [0.1049] [0.2761] [0.1091] 
Regional variables      
Household in Red River Delta Binary 0.2606 0.2071 0.2437 0.2105 
  [0.0138] [0.0082] [0.0145] [0.0082] 
Household in North East Binary 0.1172 0.1132 0.1340 0.1113 
  [0.0092] [0.0057] [0.0108] [0.0056] 
Household in North West Binary 0.0244 0.0308 0.0302 0.0321 
  [0.0040] [0.0030] [0.0056] [0.0031] 
Household in North Central Coast Binary 0.1536 0.1225 0.1513 0.1280 
  [0.0132] [0.0070] [0.0134] [0.0073] 
Household in South Central Coast Binary 0.0650 0.0907 0.0579 0.0899 
  [0.0073] [0.0056] [0.0075] [0.0055] 
Household in Central Highlands Binary 0.0772 0.0512 0.0885 0.0545 
  [0.0089] [0.0042] [0.0101] [0.0044] 
Household in North East South Binary 0.1400 0.1640 0.1370 0.1638 
  [0.0129] [0.0087] [0.0133] [0.0086] 
Household in Mekong River Delta Binary 0.1620 0.2205 0.1574 0.2099 
  [0.0111] [0.0084] [0.0117] [0.0081] 
Household in Living in urban areas Binary 0.2138 0.2693 0.1999 0.2806 
  [0.0137] [0.0096] [0.0139] [0.0095] 
Observations  832 3384 634 3582 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
Source: Estimation from VHLSSs 2004-2006. 
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Table A.2: Regressions of per capita expenditures 
Explanatory variables OLS - 
pooled 
sample 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
Random 
effects 
panel data        
(no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects 
panel data 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
OLS - 
pooled 
sample 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
Random 
effects 
panel data        
(no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects 
panel data 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
Borrowing from informal sources -0.2053*** -0.0535*** -0.0087 -0.0887*** -0.0187* 0.0297** 
 [0.0180] [0.0126] [0.0143] [0.0135] [0.0112] [0.0129] 
Proportion of members younger than 
16 to total household members 
   -0.5320*** -0.4902*** -0.2284*** 
   [0.0284] [0.0321] [0.0560] 
Proportion of members older than 60 
to total household members 
   -0.2120*** -0.2196*** -0.1843*** 
   [0.0269] [0.0305] [0.0641] 
Proportion of female members  to 
total household members 
   -0.0337 -0.0729** -0.1062 
   [0.0285] [0.0318] [0.0657] 
Household size    -0.0372*** -0.0777*** -0.1563*** 
    [0.0130] [0.0126] [0.0254] 
Household size squared    -0.002 0.0008 0.0066*** 
    [0.0012] [0.0011] [0.0024] 
Ratio of members with technical 
degree to total household members 
   0.7527*** 0.5466*** 0.1259** 
   [0.0338] [0.0365] [0.0586] 
Ratio of members with post 
secondary to total household 
members 
   1.2640*** 0.9964*** 0.1351 
   [0.0477] [0.0593] [0.0948] 
Area of annual crop land per capita 
(10000 m2) 
   0.2401*** 0.2298*** 0.2588*** 
   [0.0306] [0.0330] [0.0495] 
Area of perennial crop land per capita 
(10000 m2) 
   0.3599*** 0.3141*** 0.2086*** 
   [0.0474] [0.0404] [0.0593] 
Forestry land per capita (10000 m2)    0.005 -0.0337 -0.0846*** 
    [0.0164] [0.0209] [0.0193] 
Area of aquaculture water surface 
per capita (10000 m2) 
   0.4781*** 0.2673*** 0.0208 
   [0.0698] [0.0675] [0.0930] 
Road to village (yes = 1)    0.0302* 0.0228 0.0033 
    [0.0156] [0.0166] [0.0203] 
Distance to nearest daily market (km)    -0.0107*** -0.0038*** 0.0003 
    [0.0012] [0.0013] [0.0012] 
Red River Delta Omitted      
       
North East    -0.1293*** -0.1714***  
    [0.0172] [0.0279]  
North West    -0.3339*** -0.4463***  
    [0.0308] [0.0481]  
North Central Coast    -0.1823*** -0.1704***  
    [0.0183] [0.0275]  
South Central Coast    -0.0498** -0.0359  
    [0.0195] [0.0316]  
Central Highlands    -0.1583*** -0.1704***  
    [0.0278] [0.0441]  
North East South    0.2610*** 0.1846***  
    [0.0210] [0.0330]  
Mekong River Delta    0.0426** 0.0286  
    [0.0167] [0.0253]  
Urban    0.3992*** 0.4366***  
    [0.0203] [0.0271]  
Time effect (2006 variable)    0.1062*** 0.1191*** 0.1264*** 
    [0.0106] [0.0070] [0.0075] 
Constant 8.3163*** 8.2446*** 8.2814*** 8.3995*** 8.5235*** 8.8336*** 
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Explanatory variables OLS - 
pooled 
sample 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
Random 
effects 
panel data        
(no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects 
panel data 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
OLS - 
pooled 
sample 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
Random 
effects 
panel data        
(no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects 
panel data 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
 [0.0084] [0.0130] [0.0025] [0.0413] [0.0449] [0.0775] 
Observations 8432 8432 8432 8432 8432 8432 
R-squared 0.0154 0.0109 0.0109 0.4660 0.4570 0.1900 
Number of households 4216 4216 4216 4216 4216 4216 
Hausman test χ2 (Prob) 
(H0: Difference in coefficients in fixed 
and random effects regression not 
systematic)  
  
43.7 
(0.000)   
315.0 
 (0.000) 
Robust standard errors in brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Estimation from panel data VHLSSs 2004-2006. 
 
 
Table A.3: Instrumental variables regressions of per capita expenditures 
Explanatory variables Pooled 
sample: IV 
regression 
with one 
instrument 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
Pooled 
sample: IV 
regression 
with two 
instruments 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
Random 
effects 
panel data:   
IV 
regression 
with one 
instrument 
(no 
sampling 
weight) 
Random 
effects 
panel data:   
IV 
regression 
with two 
instruments 
(no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects 
panel data:   
IV 
regression 
with one 
instrument 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects 
panel data:   
IV 
regression 
with two 
instruments 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
Borrowing from informal sources 0.0983** 0.1034** 0.1002*** 0.1042*** 0.1271*** 0.1274*** 
 [0.0415] [0.0413] [0.0371] [0.0369] [0.0457] [0.0445] 
Proportion of members younger than 
16 to total household members 
-0.5581*** -0.5586*** -0.4994*** -0.4997*** -0.2295*** -0.2295*** 
[0.0278] [0.0278] [0.0302] [0.0302] [0.0555] [0.0555] 
Proportion of members older than 60 
to total household members 
-0.2043*** -0.2038*** -0.2093*** -0.2090*** -0.1803*** -0.1803*** 
[0.0234] [0.0234] [0.0268] [0.0268] [0.0651] [0.0651] 
Proportion of female members  to 
total household members 
-0.0367 -0.0368 -0.0715** -0.0715** -0.0926 -0.0926 
[0.0263] [0.0263] [0.0300] [0.0300] [0.0671] [0.0671] 
Household size -0.0447*** -0.0448*** -0.0801*** -0.0802*** -0.1593*** -0.1593*** 
 [0.0103] [0.0103] [0.0109] [0.0109] [0.0254] [0.0254] 
Household size squared -0.0013 -0.0013 0.0010 0.0010 0.0067*** 0.0067*** 
 [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0024] [0.0024] 
Ratio of members with technical 
degree to total household members 
0.7901*** 0.7902*** 0.5424*** 0.5422*** 0.1260** 0.1260** 
[0.0330] [0.0330] [0.0321] [0.0321] [0.0521] [0.0521] 
Ratio of members with post 
secondary to total household 
members 
1.3173*** 1.3182*** 1.0082*** 1.0085*** 0.1457 0.1457 
[0.0456] [0.0456] [0.0492] [0.0492] [0.0946] [0.0946] 
Area of annual crop land per capita 
(10000 m2) 
0.2273*** 0.2278*** 0.2379*** 0.2382*** 0.2559*** 0.2559*** 
[0.0318] [0.0318] [0.0331] [0.0331] [0.0484] [0.0484] 
Area of perennial crop land per capita 
(10000 m2) 
0.3956*** 0.3957*** 0.3123*** 0.3122*** 0.1990*** 0.1990*** 
[0.0408] [0.0408] [0.0396] [0.0396] [0.0580] [0.0580] 
Forestry land per capita (10000 m2) 0.0080 0.0081 -0.0323 -0.0323 -0.0844*** -0.0844*** 
 [0.0223] [0.0224] [0.0217] [0.0217] [0.0201] [0.0201] 
Area of aquaculture water surface 
per capita (10000 m2) 
0.4968*** 0.4971*** 0.2650*** 0.2649*** 0.016 0.016 
[0.0860] [0.0860] [0.0795] [0.0795] [0.0912] [0.0912] 
Road to village (yes = 1) 0.0307* 0.0306* 0.0217 0.0216 0.0036 0.0037 
 [0.0158] [0.0158] [0.0140] [0.0140] [0.0187] [0.0187] 
Distance to nearest daily market (km) -0.0091*** -0.0091*** -0.0038*** -0.0038*** 0.0004 0.0004 
 [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0009] [0.0009] 
Red River Delta Omitted      
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Explanatory variables Pooled 
sample: IV 
regression 
with one 
instrument 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
Pooled 
sample: IV 
regression 
with two 
instruments 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
Random 
effects 
panel data:   
IV 
regression 
with one 
instrument 
(no 
sampling 
weight) 
Random 
effects 
panel data:   
IV 
regression 
with two 
instruments 
(no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects 
panel data:   
IV 
regression 
with one 
instrument 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects 
panel data:   
IV 
regression 
with two 
instruments 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
 
      
North East -0.1525*** -0.1523*** -0.1671*** -0.1669***   
 [0.0177] [0.0177] [0.0226] [0.0226]   
North West -0.3778*** -0.3773*** -0.4358*** -0.4354***   
 [0.0279] [0.0279] [0.0351] [0.0351]   
North Central Coast -0.1484*** -0.1482*** -0.1659*** -0.1657***   
 [0.0186] [0.0186] [0.0239] [0.0240]   
South Central Coast -0.0088 -0.0083 -0.0259 -0.0255   
 [0.0202] [0.0202] [0.0258] [0.0259]   
Central Highlands -0.1460*** -0.1461*** -0.1734*** -0.1735***   
 [0.0245] [0.0245] [0.0311] [0.0311]   
North East South 0.2046*** 0.2049*** 0.1914*** 0.1916***   
 [0.0189] [0.0189] [0.0242] [0.0242]   
Mekong River Delta 0.0567*** 0.0570*** 0.0368* 0.0371*   
 [0.0168] [0.0168] [0.0211] [0.0211]   
Urban 0.3916*** 0.3916*** 0.4396*** 0.4397***   
 [0.0186] [0.0186] [0.0201] [0.0201]   
Time effect (2006 variable) 0.1206*** 0.1208*** 0.1242*** 0.1244*** 0.1309*** 0.1310*** 
 [0.0102] [0.0102] [0.0064] [0.0064] [0.0071] [0.0071] 
Constant 8.3674*** 8.3664*** 8.5008*** 8.5001***   
 [0.0377] [0.0378] [0.0401] [0.0402]   
Observations 8432 8432 8432 8432 8432 8432 
Number of households 4216 4216 4216 4216 4216 4216 
Robust standard errors in brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Estimation from panel data VHLSSs 2004-2006. 
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Table A.4: First-stage regressions of IV models  
Explanatory variables Pooled 
sample: IV 
regression 
with one 
instrument 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
Pooled 
sample: IV 
regression 
with two 
instruments 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
Random 
effects 
panel data:   
IV 
regression 
with one 
instrument 
(no 
sampling 
weight) 
Random 
effects 
panel data:   
IV 
regression 
with two 
instruments 
(no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects 
panel data:   
IV 
regression 
with one 
instrument 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects 
panel data:   
IV 
regression 
with two 
instruments 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
Proportion of informal borrowers per 
district (instrumental variable) 
1.0029*** 1.0513*** 1.0008*** 1.0486*** 0.9648*** 1.0177*** 
[0.0320] [0.0351] [0.0325] [0.0356] [0.0611] [0.0650] 
Proportion of informal borrowers per 
district * Proportion of members older 
than 60 to total household members 
(instrumental variable) 
 -0.4349***  -0.4279***  -0.4448** 
 [0.1290]  [0.1306]  [0.1994] 
Proportion of members younger than 
16 to total household members 
0.0927*** 0.0918*** 0.0918*** 0.0909*** -0.0011 -0.0063 
[0.0211] [0.0211] [0.0222] [0.0222] [0.0622] [0.0623] 
Proportion of members older than 60 
to total household members 
-0.0875*** -0.0357 -0.0863*** -0.0354 -0.0334 0.0149 
[0.0177] [0.0234] [0.0188] [0.0244] [0.0587] [0.0614] 
Proportion of female members  to 
total household members 
0.0143 0.0155 0.01 0.0113 -0.1507** -0.1433** 
[0.0202] [0.0202] [0.0214] [0.0214] [0.0656] [0.0658] 
Household size 0.0113 0.0114 0.0112 0.0113 0.0221 0.0208 
 [0.0079] [0.0079] [0.0083] [0.0083] [0.0187] [0.0186] 
Household size squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0004 -0.0003 
 [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0015] [0.0015] 
Ratio of members with technical 
degree to total household members 
-0.037 -0.0368 -0.0319 -0.0317 0.002 0.0036 
[0.0254] [0.0254] [0.0262] [0.0262] [0.0531] [0.0531] 
Ratio of members with post 
secondary to total household 
members 
-0.1453*** -0.1438*** -0.1438*** -0.1424*** -0.1215 -0.1209 
[0.0346] [0.0346] [0.0364] [0.0364] [0.0837] [0.0838] 
Area of annual crop land per capita 
(10000 m2) 
-0.0745*** -0.0756*** -0.0697*** -0.0707*** 0.0324 0.034 
[0.0243] [0.0243] [0.0254] [0.0254] [0.0439] [0.0443] 
Area of perennial crop land per capita 
(10000 m2) 
-0.0099 -0.0073 -0.0045 -0.0019 0.0915 0.0962 
[0.0314] [0.0314] [0.0324] [0.0324] [0.0592] [0.0594] 
Forestry land per capita (10000 m2) -0.0252 -0.025 -0.0233 -0.0231 -0.0017 -0.0013 
 [0.0172] [0.0172] [0.0177] [0.0177] [0.0205] [0.0207] 
Area of aquaculture water surface 
per capita (10000 m2) 
-0.0284 -0.0298 -0.0222 -0.0237 0.0102 0.007 
[0.0661] [0.0660] [0.0677] [0.0676] [0.1072] [0.1075] 
Road to village (yes = 1) -0.0043 -0.0045 -0.0029 -0.0031 0.0163 0.0158 
 [0.0122] [0.0122] [0.0124] [0.0123] [0.0204] [0.0204] 
Distance to nearest daily market (km) 0.0009 0.0009 0.0007 0.0006 -0.0013 -0.0014 
 [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0012] [0.0012] 
Red River Delta Omitted      
 
      
North East -0.0023 -0.0015 -0.0019 -0.0011   
 [0.0136] [0.0136] [0.0146] [0.0146]   
North West -0.0248 -0.0232 -0.024 -0.0224   
 [0.0213] [0.0213] [0.0228] [0.0228]   
North Central Coast 0.0056 0.0055 0.0057 0.0057   
 [0.0143] [0.0143] [0.0154] [0.0154]   
South Central Coast -0.0065 -0.0068 -0.0067 -0.007   
 [0.0155] [0.0155] [0.0166] [0.0166]   
Central Highlands -0.0018 -0.0032 -0.0023 -0.0036   
 [0.0188] [0.0188] [0.0202] [0.0202]   
North East South -0.0146 -0.0143 -0.015 -0.0146   
 [0.0145] [0.0145] [0.0155] [0.0155]   
Mekong River Delta -0.0054 -0.0054 -0.0056 -0.0056   
 [0.0129] [0.0129] [0.0138] [0.0138]   
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Explanatory variables Pooled 
sample: IV 
regression 
with one 
instrument 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
Pooled 
sample: IV 
regression 
with two 
instruments 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
Random 
effects 
panel data:   
IV 
regression 
with one 
instrument 
(no 
sampling 
weight) 
Random 
effects 
panel data:   
IV 
regression 
with two 
instruments 
(no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects 
panel data:   
IV 
regression 
with one 
instrument 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects 
panel data:   
IV 
regression 
with two 
instruments 
(with 
sampling 
weight) 
Urban 0.0053 0.0047 0.0058 0.0051   
 [0.0143] [0.0143] [0.0149] [0.0149]   
Time effect (2006 variable) -0.0067 -0.0071 -0.0069 -0.0073 -0.0103 -0.0109 
 [0.0078] [0.0078] [0.0072] [0.0072] [0.0082] [0.0081] 
Constant 0.028 0.0215 0.0283 0.022 0.0495 0.0445 
 [0.0288] [0.0289] [0.0302] [0.0302] [0.0657] [0.0656] 
Observations 8432 8432 8432 8432 8432 8432 
R-squared 0.130 0.131 0.132 0.133 0.113 0.113 
Number of households 4216 4216 4216 4216 4216 4216 
Weak IV identification test: Cragg-
Donald F statistic 
(Ho: Instruments are weak) 
882.2 497.4   372.2 188.9 
Robust standard errors in brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Estimation from panel data VHLSSs 2004-2006. 
 
Table A.5: Tests on weak instruments and overidentification of IV, and endogeneity 
of formal credit IV regressions 
 Pooled sample: IV regression 
with two instruments (with 
sampling weight) 
Fixed effects panel data: IV 
regression with two instruments 
(with sampling weight) 
Overidentification of IV: Hansen J statistic 
(Ho: Instruments are valid) )1(
χ =  1.313 
P-value =  0.251 
)1(χ = 0.002 
P-value = 0.961 
   
Test of endogeneity of “borrowing from informal 
sources”: Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic 
(Ho: Informal borrowing is exogenous) 
)1(χ =  21.6 
P-value = 0.000 
)1(χ =  5.291 
P-value = 0.021 
   
 
 
